



# Verifying Hardware Security Modules with Information-Preserving Refinement

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
Threat model: adversary compromises host machine, **gaining full control over the I/O interface** to the HSM.




Our approach relates an HSM implementation's **wire-level behavior** to a functional specification's input-output behavior.



Information-preserving refinement (IPR) says the **implementation's wire-level / timing behavior leaks no information**.



We built the *Knox* framework for **verifying HSMs with IPR**.



We **built and verified 3 simple HSMs**, and we showed that our approach catches hardware/software bugs and timing channels.

HSM	Spec		Driver	HW	SW	Proof
	core	total				
PIN-protected backup HSM	32	60	110	2670	190	470
Password-hashing HSM	5	150	90	3020	240	650
TOTP token	10	180	80	2950	360	830

*Knox* is a new framework for building hardware security modules (HSMs) with high assurance through formal verification.

Using a new security definition called *information-preserving refinement*, Knox helps developers rule out hardware bugs, software bugs, and timing side channels in HSMs.



[anish.io/knox](https://anish.io/knox)